contrast, has long been interested in informal or emergent social and political processes. But we suspect there is another influence at work here. From the outset, social-movement scholars within sociology appear to have assumed the efficacy of movements as vehicles of social and political change, whereas political scientists have tended to view social movements as politically ineffectual, stressing instead the role of elections and public opinion as the main popular mechanisms mediating policy shifts.
It is time, in our view, to broaden the study of social movements by incorporating insights from both disciplines. Some of this is already happening. For example, sociologists have taken to systematically assessing the impact of social movements on specific policy outcomes, rather than simply assuming effects. Still, with few exceptions, sociologists continue to evince little interest in the popular policy mechanisms of concern to political scientists. The disregard for public opinion is especially regrettable in our view. More specifically, the links between protest activity, shifts in public opinion, and policy change should be of central concern to social-movement scholars.
If sociologists assume the impact of movements without testing for effects, political scientists, with few exceptions (Fording 1997; Lohmann 1993 ; Rochon 1998; Tarrow 1998), continue to make the opposite error: assuming the ineffectuality of movements. Some of this rests on a stereotypic-and somewhat outdated-view of social movements as small collections of marginal outsiders, easily ignored by policy elites. But some movements are neither small (e.g., women's, environment, civil rights, etc.) nor properly conceived of as outside of mainstream institutions. The work of Katzenstein (1990 Katzenstein ( , 1998 , McCann (1994), Meyer and Tarrow (1997) , and others represents an important corrective to the simplified insider/ outsider view of formal institutions and social movements. The increasing institutionalization of the social-movement form in the United States and other Western democracies makes it all the more important for political scientists to take social movements seriously as a potential influence on policy processes (McAdam 1998 Lohmann's (1993) work is especially promising in this regard, as both theorize the complex relationships between protest activity, public opinion, and policy outcomes. We draw heavily on their work while also seeking to extend it. Specifically, we identify three mechanismsdisruptive protest, signaling, and public opinion shift-that we believe may help account for the variable impact social movements have on policy processes.
Besides this theoretical contribution, the empirical focus of our work bears mention as well. We seek to understand the predictive mechanisms that account for socialmovement impacts in one of the most significant, yet curiously understudied, movements in recent U.S. history. Although the Vietnam era antiwar movement remains one of the most intense, large-scale, and divisive movements in American history, it has been almost totally ignored by social-movement scholars. One of the few exceptions is Burstein and Freudenburg's (1978) article on the impact (or lack there of) of antiwar demonstrations on Senate voting on Vietnam War-related measures. Alas, the Burstein and Freudenburg article did not inspire other similar efforts. Instead, it remains a singular piece topically and ahead of its time in its creative use of systematic quantitative data to address the issue of movement outcomes. This lack of systematic research on the antiwar struggle by social-movement scholars is in marked contrast to the voluminous literatures on the civil rights struggle and moder women's movement. So while extending our understanding of the dynamics of'socialmovement outcomes, we hope as well to shed empirical light on the dynamics of contention associated with this neglected social movement. We begin by offering a brief history of the Vietnam War and the domestic struggle it set in motion.
VIETNAM: THE WAR ABROAD AND AT HOME
Our research focuses on antiwar protests, Congressional voting, and public opinion during the crucial period, 1965 to 1973. We focus on these years because they nicely demarcate the active period of domestic con- Under the terms of that settlement, Vietnam was to be unified through a popular election that was to take place in the summer of 1956. Fearing the outcome of the contest, the United States worked with allies to block the election, leaving the fate of the country unresolved and requiring ever greater commitments of American financial, diplomatic, and military resources to maintain the illegal arrangement. These efforts continued under three Presidents-Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson-until the still-controversial Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964 allowed Johnson the freer hand he sought to expand America's military involvement in the country.
The Tonkin Gulf Resolution marked a decisive turning point in America's long Vietnam saga. It did not, however, immediately engender significant opposition to the stepped-up U.S. war effort. Indeed, on August 4, the Resolution passed the House unanimously and occasioned only two dissenting votes in the Senate. Nor did the fall presidential race occasion any electoral protest against Johnson's Vietnam policy. On the contrary, Johnson defeated his opponent, Barry Goldwater, in one of the most lopsided races in presidential history. But if antiwar dissent lay dormant through 1964, the situation changed markedly the following year. As troop levels rose rapidly and combat deaths grew apace of those levels, so too did public attention and opposition to the war. By May of 1965 the war had replaced civil rights as the "most important problem confronting the country" (Gallup 1972). And while a sizable majority of the American public still expressed support for the war effort, a burgeoning antiwar movement rooted on campus and in established peace groups expanded rapidly.
By the middle of 1966, 55 percent of the American public had come to regard the war as the country's most pressing problem (Gallup 1972). Although still in the minority, the percentage that had come to view the war as a "mistake" had risen to 35 percent. Reflecting these trends, antiwar protests grew ever larger and more disruptive. The October 1967 March on the Pentagon represented a new and disturbing high-water mark in antiwar protest, featuring perhaps 20,000 participants, repeated clashes with police, and some 647 arrests and 47 injuries requiring hospitalization (DeBenedetti 1990).
The Tet Offensive in February, 1968 deepened the domestic crisis still further by undermining public confidence in the government's handling of the war, and especially its continued rosy assurances that the war was "winnable." Having consistently portrayed the enemy as limited in its military capacity, the coordinated assaults that marked Tet, and for a time threatened several major South Vietnamese cities, soured public opinion all the more. So much so that Lyndon Johnson was forced to withdraw from the 1968 presidential race on the strength of growing antiwar sentiment. Ironically, it was that ultimate Cold warrior, Richard Nixon, who was to be the ultimate beneficiary of this sentiment as he defeated Johnson's Vice President, Hubert Humphrey, in the November election.
Nixon's antiwar "honeymoon" proved short-lived, however. The nationally coordinated Moratorium days held on October 15 and November 15, 1969 proved to be the largest single actions mounted by the antiwar movement. That same November, antiwar sentiment among the general public peaked as well, with 55 percent of those polled pronouncing the war a "mistake" (Boettcher 1985:446) . The spring of 1970 brought heightened outrage, as leaks to the press laid bare Nixon's secret bombing campaign against suspected Vietcong bases in neutral Cambodia. Student reaction was immediate and intense. Protest peaked following the May 4 killing of four antiwar protestors at Kent State University, as countless colleges and universities shut down or otherwise suspended normal activities in deference to the deaths and the broader domestic crisis occasioned by the war. It was something of a surprise, then, when campus antiwar protest waned markedly following the reopening of campuses in the fall of 1970. As Nixon announced further troop reductions (even while maintaining his massive air campaign) and stepped up his efforts to forge a negotiated peace agreement with Hanoi, antiwar activity declined still further. By the time the Paris Peace Accords were signed in January of 1973, the movement was largely moribund.
MOVEMENT OUTCOMES/ POLICY CHANGE
We began by highlighting the very different conclusions reached by political scientists and sociologists concerning the impact of social movements on the policy process. With notable exceptions (e.g., Lipsky 1968), the conventional view in political science has been one that attributes little influence to social movements as vehicles of policy change. At least two dominant lines of research and theory in the field have converged to support this conclusion. The first is the voluminous literature spawned by Olson's (1965) book, The Logic of Collective Action. Concluding that it is irrational for someone to engage in costly collective action when they cannot be denied the benefits of such action, Olson and his many disciples have fashioned a powerful perspective that strongly implies the ineffectiveness of social movements as a force for policy change. There are actually two distinct implications here. The first concerns the possibility of mounting collective action. If rational actors refrain from such action, then it should be nearly impossible to organize a movement in the first place. The second implication has to do with those who might take part in a movement, given its demonstrated irrationality. If rational actors can be counted on to refrain from such action, then only those with nonrational motives (e.g., extreme ideologues) are likely to gravitate to social movements, and this will generally keep the movements small and politically impotent.
The latter implication of the rational choice perspective shades into the second body of work alluded to above. This is the rich, if amorphous, work in political science that stresses the strategic preference of elected policymakers for broad centrist policies that can attract majority support. The study of social movements emerged as a significant subfield within sociology during the 1980s and has flourished ever since. For most of this period, the basic assumption of sociological analysts of social movements tended in the opposite direction from their colleagues in political science. Far from assuming the policy irrelevance of movements, sociologists asserted the impact of movements without, however, typically subjecting this assumption to systematic empirical tests.
In recent years this has changed, and while more work is still needed on the topic, a discernible literature on "movement outcomes" has begun to emerge in sociology ( Below we hypothesize three different mechanisms through which antiwar protests may affect the pace and valence of Congressional action. These mechanisms reflect our interest in differentiating two general ways in which public protest may shape the policy responses of state actors. These two ways are threat/disruption and persuasion. At its core, democratic theory asserts the central importance of persuasion as the primary mechanism of policy change. Juxtaposed to this view is a well-developed theme in social movement studies that equates the effectiveness of social movements with their ability to achieve bargaining leverage through the disruption (or threatened disruption) of public order. Needless to say, these two general emphases/accounts are in tension By deploying the following three mechanisms and various subsidiary hypotheses, we hope to learn more about the role that persuasion and threat/disruption play in mediating the impact of social movements.
We turn now to those mechanisms-disruptive protest, signaling, and public opinion shift-and test for their influence in predicting the relationship between antiwar protests and Congressional voting on Vietnam War-related measures.
DISRUPTIVE PROTEST
A recurrent debate in the literature concerns the tactical effectiveness of disruptive versus more moderate forms of movement action. Starting with Lipsky's (1968) classic work on "protest as a resource," many analysts have endorsed the general idea that movement success typically depends on the ability of challenging groups to create "negative inducements to elite bargaining" through the disruption of public order and the threat such disruption poses to the realization of elite interests (Astin et al.1975 Button (1978) and others argue (e.g., Cress and Snow 2000). But there may be an important methodological factor contributing to the mixed results as well. Quite simply, these various studies adhere to no single operational definition of "disruption." In fact, in most cases, there is no explicit operationalization mentioned in connection with the concept. But one can imagine protest events being "disruptive" in a variety of ways. A disruptive protest might feature violent tactics by demonstrators, or property damage as a byproduct of a large, yet generally peaceful protest march; or injuries to protesters resulting from overzealous police actions, and so on. In thinking through the various dimensions of public protests, we identified four features that might be thought of as contributing to the overall "disruptive" intensity of a protest event. These features are: (1) the use of violent tactics by demonstrators, (2) the use of violence by law enforcement personnel, (3) property damage as a result of the protest, and (4) injuries resulting from the protest.
In distinguishing these various dimensions, we aim to move beyond the undifferentiated conception and assessment of disruption. We seek, instead, to explore the variable impact of different components of public protest events. We do so by positing two contrasting pairs of the above protest dimensions. In the first, we differentiate violence by demonstrators from violence by police. The second pairing-property damage versus injuries-mirrors the first, with property damage resulting mostly from extreme action by demonstrators, and injuries (overwhelmingly to demonstrators) owing to the aggressive policing of protest. These pairings can also be tied to the general distinction between threat and persuasion. Although none of the four dimensions match clearly to the notion of persuasion, violence by demonstrators and property damage are reasonable proxies for threat-both represent extreme and/or violent forms of protest by movement groups. Drawing on the traditional movement literature, our first hypothesis posits a significant impact of these more threatening dimensions of protest events.
Hypothesis 1: Protest events featuring vio-
lence by demonstrators and/or property damage will be related to an increase in House and Senate voting and an increase in the pro-peace results of those votes.
Hypothesis 1 rests on a simple view of the relationship between disruption and Congressional action; that is, the more extreme or violent the forms of action, the more and more favorable the Congressional response.
But the movement literature suggests a second, more qualitative link between disruption and state response. In particular, studies of the civil rights movement suggest that it is not disruption per se, but disruption characterized by violence directed against the movement that is especially productive of favorable government response (McAdam 1982 (McAdam , 1983 . This account suggests a second way in which disruption may be linked to state action. That is, large events will be related to more roll calls and an increased likelihood of pro-peace outcomes.
Beyond the "size of the protest movement" (Lohmann 1993 :319), Lohmann offers few specifics on how elected officials read public protest. But she suggests another meaningful feature of mass political activity when she writes that "the political leader discounts the observed turnout for extremist political action and shifts policy [only] if the estimated number of activist moderates exceeds a critical threshold" (p. 319, italics added). If elected officials are motivated to read public protests for whatever signs of majoritarian policy sentiment they may reveal, it makes sense-following Lohmannto hypothesize a negative effect of protests characterized by the use of especially violent or "extremist" tactics. Although Lohmann's stress is on the revealed "policy preferences" of activists, it seems reasonable to suggest that extremist tactics (operationalized here as violence by demonstrators and/or property damage) would be interpreted by policymakers as synonymous with extreme, and therefore nonmajoritarian, policy positions. Use of such tactics are thus likely to motivate elected officials to signal opposition to the protesters by voting to sustain the policy status quo.
Hypothesis 4: Protest events featuring vio-
lence by demonstrators and/or property damage will be related to a decrease in House and Senate voting and a decrease in the pro-peace results of those votes.
Note that Hypothesis 4 runs exactly counter to the functional view of disruption sketched in Hypothesis 1. That is, rather than viewing extreme and/or violent forms of protest as strategically effective, Hypothesis 4 posits that certain forms of disruption signal extremist views, and thus work to the detriment of the movement. These opposite predictions can be traced back to the fundamental distinction between threat and persuasion. Hypothesis 1 assumes the strategic effectiveness of threat, while Lohmann's notion of signaling is consistent with the stress on persuasion in traditional democratic theory. The general notion of persuasion also underlies our third and final mechanism: public opinion shift.
PUBLIC OPINION SHIFT
The link between public opinion and policy outcomes has interested political scientists (and to a lesser extent, economists) for years (Arnold 1990 All of this suggests a less direct link between protest, public opinion, and policy change than the one imagined by Lohmann. Here protest does not work directly-as a signal-to change the policies of leaders, but rather does so only indirectly by first shifting public opinion in the direction of movement goals. Once opinion has shifted in this way, it then acts, in the manner consistent with the aforementioned research (and classical democratic theory) to alter the policy preferences of those public officials who are subject to electoral pressures. This is the third and final mechanism-public opinion shift-alluded to above.
Alas, as noted previously, political sociologists have evinced far less interest in public opinion than have political scientists. Especially regrettable is the almost total ignorance of the topic among social movement scholars.' Indeed, the absence of attention makes it somewhat difficult to formulate hypotheses regarding the relationship between protest activity and public opinion. Drawing on sketchy scholarly evidence, we offer the following two provisional hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5: Protest events that feature violence by police and/or injuries to demonstrators will be positively related to increases in public opinion against the war.
Hypothesis 6: The simple pace of protest events will be positively related to increases in public opposition to the war as measured by public opinion polls.
Burstein (1998) is conspicuous among social movement scholars in doing work on the topic. Hypothesis 5 rests on what might be termed the "functional victimization" view articulated by scholars of the civil rights movement. Indeed, that account posits the identical two-step process imagined here. That is, violence against demonstrators led to increased public attention and support for insurgents, which, in turn, prompted increasingly favorable government action in relation to the movement. Hypothesis 6 draws exclusively on Schuman's (1972) empirical work on the changing nature of public opinion about the Vietnam War in relation to the antiwar movement. Schuman shows that increasing protests led to both growing opposition to the war and a decided public opinion backlash against the movement.
Our final hypothesis concerns the link between public opinion and House and Senate voting. The paucity of research on protest and public opinion made it difficult to formulate the previous two hypotheses, but the vast literature on the link between public opinion and policy outcomes makes this last hypothesis easy to state: Hypothesis 7: Increased public opinion against the war will be positively related to increases in the pace of Congressional voting and the likelihood of propeace outcomes from the votes.
PROTEST EVENT RESEARCH
The term protest event research refers to empirical work on social movements that utilizes content coding of newspaper accounts of movement events to study the dynamics of contention involving movement and other actors (i.e., countermovements, state actors, etc. We take this evidence of newspaper bias very seriously, and needless to say, it poses serious challenges to those who would use such data to study social movement or other public collective action. But the challenges vary considerably depending on the specific nature of the event research. For instance, comparing the results of "national" versus more local studies of protest activity would seem to support a straightforward conclusion: All things equal, the more local the focus of attention, the more credible the use of newspapers as a source of event data. The other strong conclusion that we draw from the multiple critiques of the method is that studies focusing on events as a dependent variable are far more questionable than those treating those same events as an independent, or predictor, variable. To treat events as an outcome variable would seem to require that the analyst view events as a credible proxy for some underlying temporal pattern of action, an assumption strongly challenged by the various studies we reviewed above. To study the impact of events-more accurately the impact of reported events-on some later outcome variable (e.g., public opinion, state action, etc.) does not oblige the analyst to make this 2 The Panther Speaks was the official newspaper of the Black Panther Party during the period in question. The Berkeley Barb was a prominent left "underground" paper during the same period. same assumption. On the contrary, when events are deployed as an independent variable, the method honors the central insight that informs the various critiques reviewed above. That is, rather than treat newspapers as a passive channel of communication, the use of events as a predictor variable acknowledges the active role of the print media as an influence on the dynamics of contention.
The empirical case at issue here can be used to illustrate our point. The principal dependent variable in our analysis is Congressional voting. If we were to try to identify the main sources of influence on votes by individual Senators or members of Congress, what would the prime candidates be? It might be nice to believe that individual conscience would be decisive in this regard, but most Congressional analysts have long asserted the primacy of two more self-interested influences. One is party loyalty, and the other is the perceived "electoral returns" to a given pattern of voting. The latter factor involves aligning one's voting record to the preferences of whatever electoral constituency the Senator or member of Congress sees as key to his or her reelection. But how do these elected officials monitor electoral preference? Today, regular tracking polls and focus-group analyses have become key to this effort. But neither technique was widely used in the Vietnam War era. Instead, in trying to gauge how the war was "playing in Peoria," Senators and members of Congress would have relied primarily on letters from constituents in their home states, irregular public opinion polls, and media reports of pro-war and antiwar demonstrations. And no newspaper probably played a more central role in these assessment efforts than The New York Times. Indeed, the criticisms of the paper by scores of politicians during these years-Nixon, Johnson, and Agnew are only the most prominent to come to mindonly serves to make the point. In its coverage of reported events, no less than in its editorial policy, the Times was an active influence on public discourse and policymaking during the war. Indeed, our efforts to assess the impact of antiwar protests on Congressional voting depends on the mediating influence of the Times. We define a public protest event as any event or action "in which individuals collectively make a claim or express a grievance on behalf of a social movement organization or [aggrieved] social category" (Uhrig and Van Dyke 1996:1). Our operational definition of a protest event specifies three "defining features" that the event must exhibit to be included in the data set. First, the act must involve a group of people rather than a single individual. Second, it must involve "contentious claim-making." That is, at the heart of the event there must be, implicitly or explicitly, a demand for either a change in society or an avowed desire to resist a proposed change. In the case of the Vietnam War, this would mean that protests would need to be motivated by either a desire to change the nature of U.S. war-making policy or to resist efforts to change that policy.3 The 3 But while we are theoretically as interested third and final qualifying feature of the event concerns the identity of the initiating actors. We accept two types of actions: those initiated by named social movement organizations (SMO), or those by any "actor performing in a manner outside that actor's official capacity to express a grievance, claim, belief, or opinion" (Uhrig and Van Dyke 1996:2). The intent here was to demarcate a terrain of protest action distinct from other more conventional forms of claim-making or other political activity.
Although not identical to the coding conventions employed by other event researchers, these definitions are nonetheless of a piece with earlier work in the tradition. Even while employing these definitions, however, we treat events differently than many past researchers. Traditionally, event researchers have utilized simple counts of events to measure movement activity. Our data will allow us to do that as well, but in addition to these event counts, however, we will want to assess the impact of movement activity by attending to various dimensions or features of protest events.
DISRUPTIVE EVENTS
As noted above, a good many analysts have argued that social movements become a significant force for social change only when they succeed in generating "bargaining leverage" through the disruption of normal social or political routines. But simple event counts tell us next to nothing about the disruptive intensity of the aggregated actions. To get at this theoretically important aspect of movement actions, we code all of our events along the following four dichotomous dimensions4: (1) injuries-were there any injuries reported in connection with the event? (2) violence by demonstrators-did in pro-war as in antiwar protests during this period, the paucity of the former has led us to focus exclusively on antiwar protests.
4 We originally intended to employ a sixth dimension in this part of our research. The sixth dimension focused on the presence/absence of deaths in connection with the event. Assuming one values the generally nonviolent character of American politics, the good news is that too few events featured deaths (three by actual count) to allow us to employ this dimension in the study.
the event feature the use of violence by demonstrators? (3) violence by police-did the event feature the use of violence by police? and (4) property damage-did the event result in property damage? In addition to these four dimensions, we differentiate protest events based on the number of movement participants involved. We identify those events with more than 10,000 participants and those with less than 1,000 participants. Our use of these five dimensions (the four above plus size) is straightforward. Besides employing simple event counts, we want to determine whether the predictive power of our models is increased when we substitute any one or various combinations of these dimensions for the event counts. The theoretical significance of these substitutions is worth highlighting. If, as many have argued, movements owe their force as social change vehicles to their disruptive capacity, then these dimensions-especially those capturing especially extreme or violent movement action (e.g., violence by demonstrators, property damage)-ought to produce stronger predictive effects than models employing simple event counts.
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: HOUSE AND SENATE ROLL-CALL VOTES
We derive our two main dependent variables from all House and Senate roll-call votes on Vietnam War-related measures between 1965 and 1973. We operationalize pace as the monthly counts of all relevant roll calls, and valence as the proportion of legislators voting the peace position in a given month. In employing these two dependent variables, we seek to distinguish between two critically important forms of political influence: agenda setting-or "agenda responsiveness," as Schumaker (1975) termed it-on the one hand, and-policy change on the other. Too often, in our view, movement analysts adopt some version of policy change as the only salient metric for assessing impact, while ignoring the fact that agenda setting is both a significant achievement in its own right and a prerequisite for policy change.
These two roll-call measures were generated using a unique and invaluable data set compiled by Rosenthal and Poole (1991) entitled "United States Congressional Roll Call Voting Records, 1789-1987: Reformatted Data."5 The data set includes every rollcall vote taken in the Senate or House between 1789 and 1987. Each entry in the data set includes information about the date the vote was taken, the sponsor of the vote, and the number of yes and no votes recorded for the measure. The entry also included a brief summary of the measure that allowed us to code the valence of the vote's outcome. To extract from this massive data set the votes relevant to our case, we first used the issue codes devised by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) . To ensure that we did not miss relevant measures, we included in our initial list of "candidate votes" all roll calls between 1965 and 1973 that fell into any one of the following four issue codes: "Vietnam War," "Selective Service," "Peace Movements/Pacifism/Anti-Military," and "Communists/Communism/Un-American Activities." We then winnowed the large pool of candidate events by carefully reading the summary of each one and including in the final data set only those votes that bore directly either on (1) the prosecution of the war, or (2) the workings and legislative status of the Selective Service System. Votes that bore a more tangential relationship to the Vietnam conflict (e.g., those having to do with the repression of domestic movements or U.S. relations with Communist countries such as China and the Soviet Union) were excluded from the final data set.
These procedures yielded a final data set of 236 votes, 80 taken in the House and 156 in the Senate. For each vote, we recorded the date, the distribution of yes/no votes, and, in most cases, the valence of the outcome. Forty-seven of the 236 votes yielded no clear valence and were therefore coded as missing on this dimension. 5 We gratefully acknowledge the generosity shown us by Howard Rosenthal and Keith Poole. Besides making their extraordinary data set available to us-a courtesy that is generally available to the scholarly community-they also were gracious enough to answer numerous questions, which allowed us to better adapt our methodological procedures to the ones they used in compiling their data set. Call-ups are the number of young men drafted by the U.S. military at various points during the study period. This is a 6 We accessed the website in December 2000; the statistics could change slightly because of newly available data on Vietnam deaths. We should also caution that we do not know whether these numbers are the same as the numbers of deaths accessible to the public during the Vietnam conflict. Burstein and Freudenburg (1978:117) . In our analysis, however, we also treat public opinion as a dependent variable to see whether protests have an impact on public opinion. In those models, we include only the 22 data points mentioned above. In order to account for the intrinsic linear trend, we use as a dependent variable the difference between the observed percentages and the value estimated from the above mentioned regression line.
NUMBER OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN
PERIODICALS. To measure media attention to the Vietnam War issue, we count the num-ber of related articles published in the month. Under the alphabetically ordered headings, each volume of the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) lists the title, publishing date, and name of the periodical for all the articles published in the previous year. We photocopy the pages under the heading "Vietnam" and count the number of published articles in the 108 months of our period.7 It is weighted by 1/100 to yield more accessible coefficients in our models.
METHOD: TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS WITH ZERO-INFLATED POISSON REGRESSION
The result of our data collection effort is a time-series data set spanning the 108 months of 1965 through 1973 and consisting of monthly counts for most of the variables defined above. In most of our models we lag observations in the previous month to predict the likelihood of congressional voting in the month following.
Before we choose appropriate models to generate estimates, however, we discuss three issues germane to an understanding of outcome variables in time-series data (Wonnacott and Wonnacott 1990 ). The first is autocorrelation-whether the observations in different units are correlated to one another. By conducting a Durbin-Watson test, we find the assumption of independence 7 There are two reasons that such counts may not reflect the exact number of Vietnam war-related articles. First, some articles related to the war may be classified under headings other than "Vietnam," such as "defense," "medical relief work," and so on. The task would become unmanageable if we tried to search for possible entries under all possibly related headings. This may result in an undercount of relevant articles. On the other hand, the articles under the heading "Vietnam" are not always directly related to the war. Some entries are about the geographical, cultural, and political background of Vietnam. We include all the entries under "Vietnam" because we find it difficult to set criteria to gauge how close an entry is related to the war by reading its title. This may result in an overcount of articles. Because these two sources of error are counter to one another, we are confident that the measure is a broadly credible proxy for temporal variation in media attention paid to the Vietnam War. holds; autocorrelation is not significant for our outcome measures. Substantively, this means that the likelihood of congressional voting in a month is not contingent upon how many roll calls have occurred in previous months. The second issue is whether the outcome variable has an intrinsic trend that may not be explained away by the independent variables. If we examine the shape of the temporal distribution of roll calls, there is a discernable pattern of period effects (see Figure 1 ): There appears to be an increase in Congressional action early in 1967, following a two-year period of inaction; and another period of heightened activity late in 1970 that does not subside until 1973. It is empirically unknown whether such a pattern can be accounted for by the protest events and our other covariates. With this consideration in mind, we introduce categorical variables dividing the 108 months into four periods (in turn coded into three dummy variables). We use three historical events as cutting points: the October 1967 Pentagon March, Richard Nixon's January ascension to the White House, and the May 1970 killings at Kent State. In doing so, our model will allow the rate of likely roll-call voting to differ in the four periods.
We use zero-inflated Poisson regression (ZIP) models to generate estimates for our predictions. While event-count data in principle are suitable for Poisson regression, there are two problems with using regular Poisson regression in our case. First, our outcome variables violate a key assumption for using poison regression: The variance must equal the mean. As shown in Table 1 , the variances of the three outcome variables are greater than the mean, a problem called overdispersion. Second, there is a substantial number of months in which our dependent variables will have zero value; as a result regular Poisson regression will underpredict the chances of being a zero count. ZIP models are designed to adjust the difference between the mean and variance, as well as to add more predictions of zero values on the outcome variable (Greene 1997; Long 1997) .
The general form of the models can be expressed as the following equation: 
RESULTS
We turn now to the results of our various analyses. Most of our findings are presented in two tables: Table 2 shows various models predicting the pace of Congressional voting; Table 3 shows the same models predicting the direction or valence of House and Senate roll calls. We organize our results, however, not according to these two dependent variables but rather in relation to the three mechanisms and related hypotheses discussed above.
DISRUPTIVE PROTEST
We begin by assessing the relationship between various measures and dimensions of disruptive protest and the pace and direction of House and Senate voting on war-related roll calls. Table 2 reports the results of various models predicting the monthly count of roll-call votes (e.g., pace), and Table 3 reports the same models applied to the net directional outcome of the votes (e.g., "propeace" or "pro-war").
With Hypotheses 1 and 2 we distinguish two very different ways in which disruptive protest may shape the pace and direction of Congressional roll calls. The first hypothesis rests on the notion that social movements derive their effectiveness by posing a disruptive threat to the established order. Accordingly, the more extreme the event-as measured by the presence of demonstrator violence and/or property damage-the stronger the predictive relationship with our two dependent variables. The idea is simple: Through extreme disruptions of public order, otherwise powerless groups are able to compel favorable state action motivated by the need to restore "business as usual." The results, as reported in Models 2 and 3 in these two tables, support interesting, but opposite, conclusions. More disruptive events do indeed predict a rise in the proportion of propeace votes, but these same events bear a significant negative relationship to the overall pace of Congressional voting. Increased disruption may have inclined members of Congress to vote pro-peace, but in this case at least, it also seems to have depressed the rate at which the House and Senate considered such measures. We already know the results of these analyses: The more violent or extreme the events, the fewer the roll calls. There is, however, no evidence that these same extremist signals negatively impact the direction of Congressional action. Indeed, in Table 3 both of these proxies are positively related to the likelihood of pro-peace outcomes.
Besides contradicting the hypothesized effect of extremist signals on Congressional action, this latter finding sharpens the interesting contrast between threat and persuasion that appears to run through the data. Persuasive mechanisms (e.g., signaling) appear to have been effective in compelling increased Congressional voting, but not in We begin with the link between antiwar protests and public opinion change. We offer, in Hypotheses 5 and 6, two very different characterizations of this relationship. Speculating that the perceived "victimization" of demonstrators would generate sympathy and support for the movement, we posit in Hypothesis 5 that events featuring injuries to demonstrators or violence by the police would be related to growing antiwar sentiment among the general public. In contrast, we assume, in Hypothesis 6, that it is the simple pace of protest events that shapes public opinion on the war. In Table 4 we test these two possibilities.
Before we turn to these results, however, we again call attention to a significant methodological lacunae: We are only working with 22 public opinion data points in this phase of the analysis. The best public opinion time-series concerning the war involves a single question (". .. do you think the U.S. made a mistake in sending troops to fight in Vietnam?") that was asked of the American public 22 times during our study period. As a result of the small number of public opinion observations we do not have the statistical leverage to introduce many independent variables into the analysis. In general, the limited number of observations recommends considerable caution in interpreting the following results. Now to the data at hand. In Table 4 we regress changes in the percentage of the public pronouncing Vietnam to have been a "mistake" on a handful of significant independent variables. Not surprisingly, growing public opposition to the War appears to have been powerfully shaped by the pace of the war itself-the number of deaths in Vietnam. So one of our strain measures bears a strong predictive relationship to shifts in public opinion on the war. In contrast, most of our event proxies appear to be unrelated, or only weakly related, to these same public opinion trends. (Failing to attain significance in our process of stepwise elimination, they are excluded from the model reported here.) Somewhat surprisingly, given the "victimization" thesis, this includes our measures of events with either police violence or injuries to demonstrators. There is no significant public opinion shift associated with these kinds of protest events. Even more surprising-in light of Hypothesis 6-is the negative relationship (marginally significant at p < .053) between lagged protest events and shifts in public opinion. Clearly the growing antiwar sentiment among the general public was not responsive to the overall pace of movement activity.
There is, however, one category of protest event that may be related to public opinion trends on the issue. Protests featuring violence by demonstrators may be related (marginally significant at p < .067) to growing opposition to the war.8 This finding is consistent with the association reported in Table  3 between demonstrator violence and the outcome of House and Senate voting. How should we interpret these results? The suggestion is that protests per se did not affect public opinion, but that especially violent ones did, perhaps by attracting more public attention and dramatizing the growing societal rift occasioned by the war. We should not, however, take this growing public opposition to the war as any kind of endorsement of the movement. As Schuman's (1972) research shows, escalating antiwar activity was related to both an increase in opposition to the war and a public opinion backlash against the movement.
So much for the impact of antiwar protests on public opinion. But what of the hypothesized effect of public opinion on Congressional action? Is the growing opposition to the war positively related to either the pace or direction of House and Senate roll calls? The answer, reflected in the results in Tables  2 and 3 , is, once again, mixed. While growing public opposition to the war is highly predictive of the pace of Congressional action, it is not related (or only weakly so) to the direction of voting.
DISCUSSION
In closing, we underscore what we see as the most significant implications of the results 8 The relationship between "events with violence by demonstrators" and "public opinion" is significant at only the p < .10 level. But, given how difficult it is to achieve statistical significance with only 22 data observations, we are inclined to regard this result as real and theoretically meaningful. reported above. To do so, we return to the specific issues with which we led the article.
REFINING OUR UNDERSTANDING OF MOVEMENT OUTCOMES
With respect to the general issue of movement outcomes, our research supports a marked departure from the normal approach to the topic. We now have a substantial body of systematic empirical studies that convincingly link movement activity to outcomes of various kinds. What we do not yet have is anything approaching a theory or theories of what factors or dynamic mechanisms help account for these effects. Our focus on disruptive protest, signaling, and public opinion mobilization should not be mistaken for such a theory. We do, however, think that the findings related to these mechanisms are suggestive and encouraging of the more general mechanism-based approach we are advocating here. So much so that we want to underscore the potential significance of each of them.
PUBLIC OPINION MOBILIZATION-A NEGLECTED COMPONENT OF MOVEMENT DYNAMICS
Given the prominence assigned by political scientists to public opinion shift as a crucial mechanism of policy change (and the voluminous empirical evidence consistent with this view), it is incumbent on social movement analysts to pay far more attention to the impact (or lack thereof) of movement activity on public opinion change. If shifts in public opinion generally presage changes in state policy (Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson et al. 1995), then social movements may be able to indirectly shape governmental action by stimulating changes in public opinion. We wondered whether this two-step mechanism of public opinion mobilization was operating during the Vietnam War era. Interestingly, only one of the two steps is clearly verified in our findings. While growing public opposition to the war is related to the pace and valence of Congressional voting, antiwar protests (with the exception of those featuring violence by demonstrators) do not appear to have been the catalyst for the public opinion change. Granting qualified support to the second, or "functional victimization" view, large protests and those featuring police violence are highly predictive of increases in war-related Congressional roll calls, but surprisingly they are just as strongly negatively related to pro-peace outcomes. The reverse is true for the most extreme forms of movement-initiated protest. That is, those demonstrations that feature violence by demonstrators or property damage depress the pace of voting, but substantially increase the likelihood of pro-peace votes.
Whether these results are peculiar to this movement or revealing of more general links between these dimensions of disruption and various outcomes remains to be seen. The point is, by consistently attending to these dimensions of protest events, we may be able to fine-tune our understanding of the kinds of mechanisms that shape outcomes across a good many contentious episodes.
PERSUASION VERSUS THREAT IN MOVEMENT DYNAMICS
While interesting in themselves, the results per the specific mechanisms appear to conform to a more general-and somewhat counter intuitive-pattern. Our measures of extreme threat/disruption (e.g., violence by demonstrators and property damage) are, in fact, positively related to pro-peace voting, but also to depressed rates of monthly roll calls. In contrast, our two persuasive mechanisms-signaling and public opinion shiftpredict increases in roll-call votes, but little or no (or even a negative) effect on vote outcomes. Even the results concerning the "functional victimization" hypothesis can be interpreted in light of this general pattern. Courting violence by one's opponents can be seen as an extreme form of persuasionan effort to curry favor by mobilizing sympathy on behalf of the movement. Interpreted in this way, these particular results again fit the general pattern. As with our other persuasive mechanisms, violence by police and/or injuries to demonstrators increase the pace of roll-call voting, without improving the chances of pro-peace outcomes.
This general pattern underscores the daunting strategic dilemmas that social movements confront in their efforts to shape outcomes and the need of movement analysts to attend much more closely to the dynamic relationships among tactics, targets, and the ways in which certain outcomes (e.g., the successful courting of media attention through victimization) may preclude others (policymaker support for policy change). In the case of the U.S. antiwar movement, it appears that certain forms of protest were effective in compelling Congressional action (e.g., large demonstrations, those involving police violence, etc.) but not in shaping the outcome of that action, while others (violence by demonstrators) had exactly opposite effects. Only by attending to the variable patterning of such findings can we begin to understand the general dilemmas confronting social movements and the generic mechanisms on which these dilemmas may turn. TOWARD A MORE SYSTEMATIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE "WAR AT HOME"
Besides the general theoretical and methodological goals we established at the outset of this article, we are also concerned with shedding light on a contentious episode-the Vietnam era antiwar movement-that has been oddly neglected by social-movement scholars. From this perspective, we think our findings provide an interesting, systematic confirmation of what many people experienced during the peak period of domestic contention over the Vietnam War. We conclude by relating two of our findings to the lived experience of those years.
First, reviled though it was by many, the antiwar movement nonetheless exerted a powerful agenda-setting force on the federal government and U.S. society more generally. As our results show, antiwar protests-especially those of a large or injurious naturecompelled public and Congressional attention. That said, our data also clearly underscore the limits of what the movement was able to achieve in relation to U.S. policy in Vietnam. Although extreme forms of public protest may have helped shift public opinion against the war, the protests themselves had contradictory effects on the direction of House and Senate voting. Certain dimensions or forms of protest (e.g., large demonstrations, violence by police, etc.) appear to decrease the likelihood of pro-peace outcomes. Finally, in their earlier groundbreaking work, Burstein and Freudenburg (1978) showed that whatever effect antiwar protests had was confined to the period prior to 1970.
These results provide statistical confirmation of what analysts and activists experienced during the period. Drawing on the perceived lessons of the civil rights struggle, antiwar activists were motivated by an implicit understanding of, and faith in, conventional democratic theory. Educate the public about the evils of the war and mobilize and demonstrate that growing opposition, and eventually policymakers would be persuaded to modify their actions and bring the conflict to a close. Or so antiwar activists believed. As our results confirm, this expected responsiveness to popular protest and public opinion was only partly realized. The kind of extreme tactics that attracted media attention, shaped public opinion, and influenced Congressional action also depressed the overall rate of House and Senate voting. Threat/disruption may have shaped certain vote outcomes, but it did so at the cost of a generalized backlash in Congress.
Why didn't the "politics of protest" deliver the gains achieved by, say, the civil rights movement, whose tactical repertoire also mixed threat and persuasion? Perhaps because the antiwar movement never mobilized anything like the general public support and sympathy that the early civil rights struggle achieved. In turn, we view this general antipathy to the movement as a byproduct of its perceived lack of commitment to democratic practices and the general politics of persuasion. Indeed, when in the late 1960s, many black activists abandoned-or appeared to abandon-nonviolence, policymakers were less consistently responsive to the movement than they had been in the earlier civil rights phase of the struggle.
This observation motivates us to close by speculating on the paradoxical nature of politics in the United States and the peculiar strategic challenge it poses to movements. To be maximally effective, movements must be disruptive/threatening, while nonetheless appearing to conform to a democratic politics of persuasion. Democratic theory notwithstanding, threat and disruption (and even violence) have been effective means of mobilizing power in the United States, but typically not when practiced by groups perceived as antidemocratic. The early civil rights movement mastered this strategic sleight of hand. The antiwar movement never did, producing the odd mix of agenda setting impact and minimal policy responsiveness reflected in our results. 
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